"Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States"

Declassified Key Judgments of the National
Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism:
Implications for the United States" dated April 2006

Key Judgments

United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the
leadership of al-Qa'ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that
al-Qa'ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a
single terrorist organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which
includes al-Qa'ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging
networks and cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.

• Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.

• If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad
will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.

• Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority
nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over
time, such progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the
vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa'ida,
could erode support for the jihadists.
We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a
coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and
cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of
shared purpose and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.

• We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in
importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the
Homeland.

• The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking
Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and
2005 London bombings.

We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist
leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more
fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.

• The Iraq conflict has become the "cause celebre" for jihadists,
breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves,
and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry
on the fight.

We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the
movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the
timeframe of this Estimate.

• Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1)
Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western
domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the
Iraq "jihad;" (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and
political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US
sentiment among most Muslims—all of which jihadists exploit.
Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged
that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement.

They include dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the
limited appeal of the jihadists' radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of
moderation, and criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.

• The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate
political solution—an ultra-conservative interpretation of shari'a-based governance spanning the
Muslim world—is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims.

Exposing the religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda would
help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.

• Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few notable
Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to
jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism.

This also could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim
communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on passive
community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as the most powerful
weapon in the war on terror.

• Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated
multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders.
If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years,
political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and
groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless,
attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities
for jihadists to exploit.

Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, is exploiting the
situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain
its leadership role.

• The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and
al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into
smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the
mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and
disagreements.

We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a
time, pose a less serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa'ida.

• Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against
Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global
threat.

• The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa'ida
in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.

Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al-Sunnah,
and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their reach and
become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional
areas of operation.

• We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does al-Qa'ida
but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US interests abroad. The focus of
their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local regime targets and regional or global ones.

We judge that most jihadist groups—both well-known and newly formed—will use
improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on
soft targets to implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will
attempt to conduct sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with
experience in Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.

• CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups.
While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state
sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or
resources from being exploited by terrorists.

Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling
other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist
groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process
is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age,
raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters
may be difficult to pinpoint.

• We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to
communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial
support.